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CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DEFINES WHAT CONSTITUTES A "CRIME"
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)
I. FACTS
The petitioner, William Joseph Harris, owned a pawnshop in North
Carolina.1 On April 29, 1999, an undercover law enforcement agent ac-
companied a confidential informant into Harris' pawnshop.2 The agent pur-
chased a small amount of marijuana from Harris. 3 The agent then returned
the next day to Harris' shop and purchased an additional 114 grams of
marijuana.4
During both of the drug transactions with the agent, Harris carried a
handgun in an unconcealed hip holster.5 The agent testified that Harris re-
moved the handgun from its holster and explained that it "was an outlawed
firearm because it had a high-capacity magazine." 6 The agent also testified
that Harris stated he had homemade bullets that would pierce a police
officer's bulletproof vest.7
Harris was later arrested and indicted on two counts of distributing
marijuana and two counts of carrying a firearm "in relation to" drug
trafficking. 8 After the indictment, the Government dismissed one distribu-
tion of marijuana count and one firearm count. 9 Harris pled guilty to the
other count of distributing marijuana, but he decided to proceed to a bench
trial on the remaining count of carrying a firearm in relation to drug
trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).10 Section 924(c)(1)(A)
provides in relevant part:




5. Id. The handgun that Harris carried was a semiautomatic nine-millimeter Taurus. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The two counts of distributing were brought under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(l)(D). Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The remaining count of carrying a firearm was in relation to the second drug
trafficking incident on April 30, 1999. Id.
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[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime-
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.II
When preparing the indictment, the Government proceeded on the as-
sumption that § 924(c)(1)(A) defined a single crime, and that brandishing of
the firearm was a sentencing factor to be considered by the judge after
trial.12 Therefore, the indictment included nothing about brandishing the
firearm and made no reference to subsection (ii) of the statute.13 The
indictment simply alleged the elements from the statute's main paragraph. 14
At the bench trial, the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina found Harris carried a handgun in relation to a drug
trafficking offense and found him guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A). 15  Following Harris' conviction, the presentence report
recommended that he be given the seven-year minimum sentence provided
for in § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) because he had brandished the firearm.16 Harris
objected to the presentence report and argued that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, brandishing was an element of a separate offense for which
he had not been indicted or tried.17 At the sentencing hearing, the district
court overruled Harris' objection and found by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Harris had brandished the firearm within the meaning of §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (c)(4).18 The judge consequently sentenced Harris to
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
12. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 551 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Id. The elements of the main paragraph that were alleged in the indictment were "during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime" and "knowingly carried a firearm." Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
15. Id.; United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 807 (4th Cir. 2001).
16. Harris, 536 U.S. at 551; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
17. Harris, 536 U.S. at 551. Harris based his argument on the Supreme Court's decision in
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Id.
18. Id.; Harris, 243 F.3d at 807. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) provides that:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "brandished" means, with respect to a
firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the
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the mandatory minimum of seven years imprisonment that was prescribed
by the statute. ' 9
Harris then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.20 He con-
tended that § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) did not set forth a sentencing factor, but it
was rather an element of the offense that must be set forth in the indictment
and was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 21 The Fourth Circuit
looked to the statute's language, structure, context, and history to determine
whether it should consider "brandished" a sentencing factor or an element
of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.22 The court
found that because § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) did not contain a maximum penalty,
but rather increased the minimum sentence to which Harris could be
sentenced, "brandished" did not have to be charged in the indictment and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.23 The court reasoned that failure to
charge and prove "brandished" beyond a reasonable doubt did not expose
Harris to any greater punishment than he was already exposed to.24
Harris also argued that after Apprendi v. New Jersey,25 even if the court
found "brandished" to be a sentencing factor, § 924(c)(1)(A) should have
been found unconstitutional. 26 The court found that Apprendi itself fore-
closed Harris' argument since the Supreme Court specifically stated in
Apprendi that its holding was limited to cases that involve increases in
statutory maximums. 27
firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of
whether the firearm is directly visible to that person.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4).
19. Harris, 243 F.3d at 807.
20. Harris, 536 U.S. at 552.
21. Harris, 243 F.3d at 808.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 809. The court based its reasoning on the similarity of § 924(c)(1)(A) to the statute
at issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Id. at 808-09. The statute in McMillan
provided that anyone convicted of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, in-
voluntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, or an attempt of any
of the those crimes, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the judge
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of the crime. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82, & 82 n.1; see generally 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9712 (West 1998).
24. Harris, 243 F.3d at 809. Harris could have received a seven-year sentence even if the
district court judge did not find that he brandished the firearm. Id. However, the court of appeals
did acknowledge that it was unlikely Harris would receive anything higher than five years under
the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 809 n.2.
25. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
26. Harris, 243 F.3d at 809. Harris acknowledged that the facts in Apprendi dealt with an
increase in a statutory maximum, but he argued that the same reasoning should be applied to an
increase in statutory minimums. Id. (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, Harris v. United States
243 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-4154)).
27. Id.
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The court also found that the structure of § 924(c)(1)(A) indicated that
"brandished" was a sentencing factor to be decided by a judge.28 It pointed
out that the main paragraph of § 924(c)(1)(A) was set apart from the three
subsections that followed.29 The court also rested its judgment on the fact
that the differences in penalties for the three sub-elements of § 924(c)(1)(A)
were not severe.30
The court rejected all of Harris' arguments and held that the "bran-
dished" clause of § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) constituted a sentencing factor that did
not need to be charged in an indictment or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.31 The court therefore confirmed Harris' conviction and sentence. 32
Harris appealed the Fourth Circuit's decision and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 33 The Court held "brandished" a firearm
was a sentencing factor rather than an element of a crime, and allowing the
judge to find that factor did not violate Harris' constitutional rights.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In most criminal prosecutions, an accused has the right to a fair and
speedy trial by an impartial jury. 35 This right to a jury trial does not
necessarily mean that an accused has the right to be sentenced by a jury.36
An accused facing felony charges also has the right to have a grand
jury review the presentment of an indictment. 37 The indictment must allege
28. Id. at 810.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 811. There was a two-year difference in penalty between subsections (i) and (ii)
and a three-year difference in penalty between subsections (ii) and (iii). 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
(2000).
31. Harris, 243 F.3d at 812.
32. Id.
33. Harris v. United States, 534 U.S. 1064 (2001).
34. Harris v. United States 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). But see Lewis v. United
States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (holding that there is no right to a jury trial for "petty offenses").
"An offense carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less is presumed petty, unless the
legislature has authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate that the legislature
considered the offense serious." Id. at 326.
36. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1984) (finding that the Sixth Amendment
has never been thought to guarantee the right to have a jury determine the appropriate punishment
to be imposed on an individual).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1473-74 (2001) (stating that "[t]he Fifth Amendment right to grand jury
review and the right to a jury trial in the Sixth Amendment.. . do not extend to petty offenses").
The text of the Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
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each of the elements of the offense charged.38 The indictment does not
need to set forth factors that are only relevant for sentencing the defen-
dant. 39 An indictment is issued by the grand jury if it believes that probable
cause exists that the accused committed the offense charged.no
The burden of proof at a criminal trial is on the prosecution to prove all
"elements" alleged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.41 A judge
may find those facts that are not elements of the crime, after trial, by a
preponderance of the evidence.4 2
Whether any of the above constitutional rights applies to an accused
depends on the essential elements of an offense.4 3 The Supreme Court has
wrestled with deciding which elements should be found by a jury in order to
satisfy due process."n The Court has looked at the requirements of due
process in distinguishing elements of a crime from defenses and sentencing
factors.
45
A. DISTINGUISHING ELEMENTS FROM DEFENSES
In McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co.,46 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that there are limitations on how a legislature
may define a crime.47 In McFarland, the Louisiana Legislature passed a
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (stating that "an
indictment must set forth each element of the crime it charges"); United States v. Carll, 105 U.S.
611,612 (1882) (holding that an indictment must set forth all the elements necessary to constitute
the offense to be punished).
39. Alemendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228.
40. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 52 (3d ed. 2002).
41. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 254-55 (2001) (holding that the State had the
burden of proving that the defendant was a sexually violent predator); Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting United States v. Guadin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)) (stating
that the defendant is entitled to a jury determination that he or she is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he or she is charged beyond a reasonable doubt).
42. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (holding that "visible possession
of a firearm" was a sentencing factor that could be decided by the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence and need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
43. See generally King & Klein, supra note 37, at 1503.
44. Id. at 1502.
45. Id.
46. 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
47. See McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86-87 (holding the statute at issue unconstitutional because it
violated equal protection and due process).
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law that presumed a business guilty if it paid less money for sugar in
Louisiana than it did in another state.4 8 The Court ruled that "it is not
within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or
presumptively guilty of a crime." 49
In Tot v. United States,50 the Supreme Court had another chance to
address constitutional concerns over legislative presumptions.51 The Court
ruled that in order to not violate due process, the legislature could not make
a presumption of all facts essential to guilt.52 The Court reasoned that this
was not permissible because it would place the burden upon defendants to
come forward with evidence to maintain their innocence, switching the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant.53
In Leland v. Oregon,54 the Supreme Court looked specifically at what
facts constituted an element of a crime and what facts constituted a de-
fense.55 At issue in Leland was an Oregon statute that required a defendant
who entered a plea of insanity to prove insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt.56 Although Oregon was the only state at that time to require the
accused to establish the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court ruled
that the statute did not violate due process. 57 The Court reasoned that
insanity was a defense to the crime charged, and making the defendant
prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt did not relieve the prosecution
of its burden to prove every element of the crime.58 The Court noted that
the burden on the prosecution to prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt was not a constitutional doctrine, "but only the rule to be
followed in federal courts." 59
48. Id. at 80-81.
49. Id. at 86.
50. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
51. See Tot, 319 U.S. at 467-68 (finding the statutory rule that possession of a firearm or am-
munition by any person convicted of a crime of violence was presumptive evidence that the
firearm or ammunition was received in interstate commerce to be in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
52. Id. at 469.
53. Id.
54. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
55. Leland, 343 U.S. at 793-96.
56. Id. at 792. The appellant argued that the statute violated his due process rights because it
made him disprove elements of the crime necessary for a guilty verdict. Id. at 793. In the statute,
Oregon adopted the doctrine that because most people are sane, a defendant must prove his or her
insanity to avoid responsibility. Id. at 796. This was the rule announced in an 1843 English
decision, M'Naghten's Case. Id. (citing M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843)).
57. See id. at 799 (stating that "we cannot say that [the] policy violates generally accepted
concepts of basic standards of justice").
58. Id.
59. Id. at 797.
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In In re Winship,60 the Supreme Court once again took on the constitu-
tionality of the reasonable doubt standard. 6' The Court, for the first time,
explicitly held that the "Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 62 The Court
did not, however, explicitly define what facts are necessary to constitute a
certain crime. 63
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,64 the Supreme Court refined what facts had to
be proven in a murder charge by the prosecution and what facts had to be
proven by the defendant. 65 At issue was Maine's practice of requiring a
defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation in order to reduce the homicide to man-
slaughter."66 Maine argued that Winship should not be extended to its
felonious homicide statute.67 The Court rejected this argument and ruled
that due process required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation "when the
issue is properly presented in a homicide case." 68 The Court reasoned that
it could "discern no unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify
requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical to
criminal culpability." 69
60. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-65 (discussing the importance of the reasonable doubt
standard in criminal trials).
62. Id. at 364. The Court noted that "it ha[d] long been assumed" that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal trials was constitutionally required. Id. at 362 (citing Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881)).
63. See id. at 365 (turning to the question of whether juveniles are constitutionally entitled to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
64. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
65. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
66. Id. at 684-85. Maine divided the crime of felonious homicide into three punishment cate-
gories: murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 698. Maine inter-
preted these categories as bearing on punishment and not as elements of the crime of felonious
homicide. Id. at 699.
67. Id. at 696-97. Maine argued that the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation
was not a "fact necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide. Id. at 697 (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). Maine further argued that the facts in Mullaney were
distinguished from Winship because heat of passion did not come into play until after the defen-
dant was already found guilty of felonious homicide and could be punished for at least
manslaughter. Id.
68. Id. at 703-04.
69. Id. at 702. Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion expressing that the decision in
Mullaney did not affect the Court's ruling in Leland with respect to insanity. Id. at 705-06
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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Seven years later, in Patterson v. New York,70 the Supreme Court
revisited the issue of what elements had to be proven by the prosecution in
the context of murder.71 The question presented to the Court was whether
New York's practice of placing the burden on a defendant in a murder trial
to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance was
unconstitutional as a due process violation. 72
Patterson argued that the New York statute was "functionally equiva-
lent" to the statute struck down by the Court in Mullaney.73 The Court re-
jected Patterson's argument and held that his conviction under the New
York murder statute did not deprive him of due process. 74 The Court
reasoned that New York satisfied the "mandate of Winship that it prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt 'every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [Patterson was] charged."' 75 The Court rejected Patterson's claim
that whenever a state links the "severity of punishment" to the "presence of
an identified fact," it must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.76 The
Court also refused to adopt a constitutional rule requiring states to disprove
every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to a
defendant's culpability. 77  However, the Court noted that "there are
obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this
regard." 7
8
In Martin v. Ohio,79 the State of Ohio tested the constitutional limits of
what it could require a defendant to prove. 80 The question before the Court
70. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
71. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198.
72. Id. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder, a crime with two essential ele-
ments: (1) "intent to cause the death of another person," and (2) "causing the death of such person
or of a third person." Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)). The State of New
York allowed defendants to raise the affirmative defense that they "acted under the extreme
emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." Id. Defendants
would be convicted of manslaughter if they could prove the affirmative defense of "extreme
emotional disturbance" instead. See id. at 198-99 (pointing out that New York also recognized the
crime of manslaughter, which was the intentional killing of another "under circumstances which
do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance").
73. Id. at 201.
74. Id. at 205.
75. Id. at 206 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). The Court reasoned that
death of another, intent to kill, and causation were the facts that the prosecution was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a person of murder. Id. at 205. Acting under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance was an affirmative defense, which the prosecution was
not responsible for proving. Id. at 206.
76. Id. at 214.
77. Id. at 210.
78. Id. The Court was referring to the limit on a state's ability to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling elements of a crime as affirmative defenses. Id.
79. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
80. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 230 (explaining the Ohio statute at issue).
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was whether the Due Process Clause "forbids placing the burden of proving
self-defense on the defendant when she is charged by the State of Ohio with
committing the crime of aggravated murder." 81 The Court held that
Martin's conviction did not violate the Due Process Clause.82 The Court
reasoned that Ohio did not exceed its authority in defining the crime of
aggravated murder. 83 The State did not shift the burden of proving any of
the elements of the crime to the defendant.84 A second distinction that the
Court has drawn with respect to what elements constitute a crime is
between elements and sentencing factors. 85
B. DISTINGUISHING ELEMENTS FROM SENTENCING FACTORS
In Williams v. New York,86 the Supreme Court looked at the proper role
of a judge in sentencing and the discretion that a judge may use in deciding
what punishment to give to an offender. 87 In Williams, a jury found the
defendant guilty of first-degree murder and recommended life im-
prisonment. 88 Instead of following the jury's recommendation, the sen-
tencing judge imposed a death sentence. 89 Speaking about the role of a
judge in determining sentences, the Court pointed out that judges are given
broad discretion to decide the type and extent of punishment for defen-
dants.90 The Court reasoned, "A sentencing judge.., is not confined to the
81. Id. The Ohio Code provided that the burden of production and the burden of proof,
which was by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense was on the defendant.
Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Anderson 1982)). Self-defense was an
affirmative defense under Ohio law. Id. at 231. The Ohio Code defined an affirmative defense as
"involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which he
can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence." Id. at 230 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.05(C)(2)).
82. Id. at 233. Martin was charged and convicted of aggravated murder. Id. at 231. The
crime of aggravated murder was defined as "purposely, and with prior calculation and design,
caus[ing] the death of another." Id. at 230 (alteration in original) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.01).
83. Id. at 233.
84. Id. The Court noted that its decision would have been different if the jury had been in-
structed that it could not consider self-defense evidence in determining if there was reasonable
doubt. Id. "Such an instruction would relieve the State of its burden and plainly run afoul of
Winship's mandate." Id. at 234.
85. See generally King & Klein, supra note 37, at 1502.
86. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
87. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 245-47 (pointing out the type of discretion and role the judge
has traditionally had in New York).
88. Id. at 242.
89. Id. The judge stated that the evidence had been considered in light of additional outside
information that was not presented to the jury. Id. at 242-43. This use of "outside" information in
determining the sentence was one of the grounds on which the defendant appealed. Id. at 243.
90. See id. at 244-45 (referring specifically to New York judges). During this period in
history, the trend in sentencing was to individualize punishment to each separate offender. See id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits
is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has
been determined."91
In Specht v. Patterson,92 the Supreme Court looked at what facts a
judge may decide and what facts must be put to a jury. 93 At issue in Specht
was whether a judge may sentence an offender under a different statute than
the one under which the offender had originally been convicted. 94 The
Court ruled that sentencing an offender under a different statute constituted
a new finding of fact "that was not an ingredient of the offense charged."95
The Court reasoned that the Colorado Sex Offenders Act 96 did not make the
"commission of a specified crime the basis for sentencing." 97 The Act
made one conviction the basis for commencing a different proceeding,
under a different statute, to determine whether a person constitutes a threat
of bodily harm to the general public.98 This was a fact that the judge could
not decide without a proper hearing. 99 Nineteen years later, the Court made
its first ruling on the effect of mandatory minimum sentencing on the
definition of a crime. 100
1. McMillan v. Pennsylvania
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,10' the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sen-
at 247 (stating that "[u]ndoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modem
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime").
91. Id. The statutory limits that the judge was confined to were life imprisonment or death.
Id. at 243 n.2 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a (McKinney 1949)) (stating that "[mlurder in the
first degree is punishable by death, unless the jury recommends life imprisonment").
92. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
93. Specht, 386 U.S. at 607-08.
94. Id. at 607. The petitioner was convicted for "indecent liberties" under one Colorado
statute, which carried a maximum sentence of ten years, but was sentenced under the Sex
Offenders Act, which had a sentence range of one day to life imprisonment. Id. (citing COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10, 40-2-32 (West 1963)).
95. Id. at 608. The Sex Offenders Act could be used if the trial court found that the
convicted offender "constitute[d] a threat of bodily harm" to members of the public or "[was] an
habitual offender and mentally ill." Id. at 607.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10.
97. Specht, 386 U.S. at 608.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 609-10 (holding that the petitioner was entitled to a full judicial hearing before
sentence was imposed).
100. See generally McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
101. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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tencing Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Right to Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment.1
02
The petitioners argued that "visible possession of a firearm" was an
element of the crime or crimes for which they were convicted and therefore
should have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship
and Mullaney.103 The Court rejected this argument and held that Pennsyl-
vania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act "neither alters the maximum
penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a
separate penalty." 104 The Court concluded that Pennsylvania was allowed
to treat "visible possession of a firearm" as a sentencing factor instead of an
element of a crime that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 105 The
Court reasoned that the Act only limited the sentencing judge's discretion
within the range already available to him without finding an additional
sentencing factor. 06 The petitioners' argument would have carried more
weight if the finding of "visible possession of a firearm" had exposed the
defendants to punishment that was greater than what was already allowed
by statute. 107
102. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80. The statute in question provided that anyone convicted of
third degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, or an attempt of any of those crimes, be sentenced to a
minimum of five years imprisonment if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the person "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the crime. Id. at 81-82 n. 1; 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9712 (West 1998). The text of the Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The text of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
103. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83; see also supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
104. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88. The crimes that were enumerated in the statute subjected
a defendant to a maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the first-degree felonies and
a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment for the second-degree felonies. Id. at 87. The
minimum sentence imposed for "visibly possessing a firearm" in the commission of one of the
enumerated felonies was five years. Id. at 81 n. 1.
105. ld. at 91.
106. Id. at 88.
107. Id.
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The petitioners also argued that even if "visible possession of a fire-
arm" was not an element of the crime, it nonetheless needed to be proven
by clear and convincing evidence instead of by a preponderance of the
evidence.10s The Court concluded that the preponderance standard satisfied
due process. 09 The Court reasoned that sentencing courts had traditionally
heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden at all, so
burdens of proof at sentencing should not be constitutionalized."10 Twelve
years later, the Court would again revisit the element versus sentencing
factor distinction."H
2. Almendarez-Torres v. United States
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, "1 2 the Supreme Court further
refined the constitutional limits on Congress's power to define a crime.113
At issue in Almendarez-Torres was 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which made it a crime
for a deported alien to return to the United States without permission."14
Section 1326(a) authorized a sentence of up to two years in prison."15 A
sentence of up to twenty years imprisonment was authorized if the initial
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 92. The Court also reaffirmed its holding that there was no Sixth Amendment
right to jury sentencing. Id. at 93.
111. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. Unites States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
112. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
113. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 246 (allowing Congress to treat recidivism as a
sentencing factor even though it significantly altered the maximum penalty for the crime).
114. Id. at 226; 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000). Section 1326 reads in relevant part:
Reentry of removed alien;
(a) In general.
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed
the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is
outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States...
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of the section, in the case of any alien described in
such subsection-
(1) Whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or
more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a
felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;
(2) Whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an
aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
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deportation was the result of an aggravated felony conviction.16 The peti-
tioner argued that subsection (b) defined a separate crime that must be
charged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 117
Even though § 1326(b) altered the maximum penalty for the crime
charged, the Court found the statute to be constitutional. 8  The Court
reasoned that § 1326(b) was a penalty provision and did not set forth a
separate immigration-related offense.'19 In deciding whether § 1326(b) was
a separate criminal offense, the Court set forth the factors that are relevant
to whether a particular statute should be read as a sentencing factor or a
separate criminal offense.120 A court should look to a "statute's language,
structure, subject matter, context, and history."' 2' The Court used these
factors a year later in Jones v. United States. 22
3. Jones v. United States
In Jones, the Supreme Court decided whether 18 U.S.C. § 2119 defined
three separate offenses, which needed to be charged in the indictment,
brought before a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the
statute defined a single offense with a choice of three different maximum
sentences depending on different sentencing factors.123 The Court found
that "[i]f a given statute is unclear about treating such a fact as element or
penalty aggravator, it makes sense to look at what other statutes have
done."1 24 The Court concluded that Congress probably intended "serious
116. Id. § 1326(b).
117. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (stating that the question before the Court was
whether subsection (b) defined a separate crime).
118. See id. at 243 (stating that "[wle nonetheless conclude that these differences do not
change the constitutional outcome for several basic reasons").
119. Id. at 235.
120. Id. at 228.
121. Id.
122. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
123. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 is the federal carjacking statute and reads in
relevant part:
Whoever,... takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall -
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up
to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (emphasis added).
124. Jones, 526 U.S. at 234. The Court noted that although Congress had treated "serious
bodily injury" as a sentencing factor in the past, it has customarily treated "serious bodily injury"
as defining an element of the offense of aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery is what
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bodily injury" to be an element of a separate aggravated form o f
carjacking.125
The Court then concluded that § 2119 established three different
offenses "by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged
by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury
for its verdict."126 The Court reasoned that holding § 2119 to be a single
offense with three different maximum penalties would "raise serious
constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive." 27
4. Castillo v. United States
In Castillo v. United States,128 the Supreme Court once again decided
whether a federal criminal statute created a separate element of a crime,
which must be determined by a jury, or if the statute created a sentencing
factor, which could be decided by a judge. 29 In Castillo, the defendants
were convicted in a Texas federal court of various offenses, including using
or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.130 The defendants were
then sentenced under § 924(c), which provided that if a crime of violence
was committed with a machinegun, the defendants should be sentenced to
thirty years imprisonment. 31 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial judge and concluded that statutory words such as
"machinegun" created sentencing factors, not elements of a separate
crime. 132
Congress modeled § 2119 after. See id. at 235 (citing examples of statutes where Congress treated
"serious bodily injury" as a sentencing factor).
125. Id. at 236.
126. Id. at 252.
127. Id. at 25 1. The Court relied on the rule that "where a statute is susceptible of two con-
structions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our [the Court's] duty is to adopt the latter." Id. at 239 (quoting
United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). The Court
reasoned if it held that § 2119 defined a single offense, the statute would be in constitutional doubt
in light of Mullaney, Patterson, and McMillan. Id. at 240-44.
128. 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
129. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 121.
130. Id. at 122.
131. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provided in relevant part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... , uses or carries a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ....
be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle
or a short-barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a
machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm
muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. V 1988) (amended 1998).
132. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 122-23.
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The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and found
that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) used the term "machinegun" to state an element of a
separate, aggravated crime that must be alleged in the indictment and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.133 The Court reasoned that § 924(c)'s
language, structure, context, and history all lead to the conclusion that the
relevant words created separate, substantive crimes, not merely separate
sentencing factors. 134
The Court's holdings in Mullaney, Patterson, McMillan, Almendarez-
Torres, Jones, and Castillo left the question of whether the Constitution
mandates that any fact increasing the penalty for an offense beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.135 The Court would answer that question one
year after Jones in Apprendi. 1
36
5. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon. 137 The
offenses were punishable by a term of imprisonment between five and ten
years. 138 The defendant was sentenced under a separate "hate crime law,"
which provided for an "extended term" of imprisonment if the trial judge
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was committed to
intimidate an individual because of race. 139
The question presented to the Court was whether the Due Process
Clause required factual determinations that increased the maximum sen-
tence for the crime from ten to twenty years to be made by the jury "on the
133. Id. at 131. The Court also found that the other firearm related words such as "short-
barreled shotgun" used in § 924(c) referred to elements of separate, aggravated crimes. Id.
134. Id. at 124.
135. King & Klein, supra note 37, at 1468-69.
136. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
137. Id. at 469-70. The statutes that Apprendi violated were sections 2C:39-3a and 4a of
New Jersey Statutes Annotated. Id. Apprendi fired several shots into the home of an African-
American family that had just moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. Id. at 469. A
grand jury returned a twenty-three-count indictment against Apprendi. Id. All but two of the
charges were dropped when the parties entered into a plea agreement. Id. at 469-70.
138. Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
139. Id. The "hate crime law" authorized punishment for second-degree offenses between
ten and twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 469. Possessing a firearm for an unlawful purpose was
classified as a "second-degree" offense by the New Jersey Legislature. Id. at 468 (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)). After accepting Apprendi's guilty pleas, the trial judge
held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's purpose for the shooting. Id. at 470. The
trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi's shooting was committed
with the "purpose to intimidate," and the judge sentenced him to a twelve-year prison term and
two "shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts." Id. at 471.
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basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."140 The Court concluded that the
Due Process Clause required the jury to determine whether "purpose to
intimidate" was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.14 1 Therefore, the New
Jersey statute violated due process and could not stand.142
The Court reasoned that "[o]ther than the fact of prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."143 The Court articulated this rule because it was unconstitutional
for a legislature to remove from the jury the evaluation of facts, other than
prior conviction, that increased the prearranged penalties to which a
criminal defendant was exposed.144 The Court concluded by saying,
"Despite what appears to us the clear 'elemental' nature of the factor here,
the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized
by the jury's guilty verdict?" 145 The Court reversed the judgment of the
New Jersey Supreme Court and remanded the case. 146
The Court in Apprendi did not come to a decision on whether a sen-
tencing judge could decide facts that increased the statutory minimum while
not increasing the statutory maximum sentence imposed on a defendant.147
Until Harris v. United States,148 this question was a topic of much
debate. 149
III. ANALYSIS
Harris was decided by a five-to-four majority.150 Justice Kennedy
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to parts one, two, and four, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
140. Id. at 469.
141. Id. at 491-92.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 490. This rule has become known as the "Apprendi rule." King & Klein, supra
note 37, at 1486.
144. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
145. Id. at 494.
146. Id. at 497.
147. See id. at 490 (finding that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury).
148. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
149. See King & Klein, supra note 37, at 1503; Analisa Swan, Apprendi v. New Jersey, The
Scaling Back of the Sentencing Factor Revolution and the Resurrection of Criminal Defendant
Rights, How Far is Too Far?, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 729, 730 (2002); see generally Michael E. Raabe,
New Federal Limitations on State Sentencing Opens the Door to Appeals, 44 ORANGE COUNTY
LAW 14 (2002).
150. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 548 (2002).
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Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Breyer joined.151 Justice Ken-
nedy also delivered an opinion with respect to part three, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia joined.152 Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion stating that both Jones and Apprendi
were decided wrongly.153 Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, in which he agreed with the Court's appli-
cation of Apprendi but voiced his distaste for mandatory minimum sentenc-
es. 154 Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined, disagreeing with the Court's
view that McMillan and Apprendi were reconcilable.155
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) defined a single offense,
in which "brandished" was a sentencing factor to be found by the judge, not
the jury. 156 The Court reasoned that as a matter of statutory construction,
Congress made "brandished" a sentencing factor to be found by a judge.157
The Court also reasoned that tradition and past congressional action pointed
to the same conclusion. 58 The Court then rejected Harris' argument that
the canon of constitutional avoidance mandated the Court to find
"brandished" to be an element of the crime and not a sentencing factor.159
The Court affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.160
1. As a Matter of Statutory Construction
The first question presented to the Court was whether Congress
intended "brandished" to be an element of the crime or a sentencing
factor.' 6' The Government contended that "brandished" was merely a
sentencing factor that could be decided by a judge after trial; while Harris
151. Id. at 549, 568.
152. Id. at 556.
153. Id. at 569 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
523-54 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254-72 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154. Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
155. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 556.
157. Id. at 552-53.
158. Id. at 553-55.
159. Id. at 555-56.
160. Id. at 568.
161. Id. at 552.
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contended that "brandished" was an element of the crime that had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 162
The Court pointed out that the structure of the statute suggested that
"brandished" was a sentencing factor.163 Federal statutes usually list all
offense elements "in a single sentence" and separate sentencing factors "in-
to subsections."' 64 In § 924(c)(1)(A), the statute begins with a large
paragraph stating the elements of the crime.165 Following the word "shall"
are three subsections that explain the minimum sentences required by the
statute. 166 When a statute has a structure like § 924(c)(1)(A), the Court pre-
sumes that the statute's principal paragraph defines a single crime and its
subsections define sentencing factors. 167 The text of a statute might still
provide enough evidence to prove that numbered subsections are not just
sentencing factors. 68
2. Tradition and Past Congressional Action
The Court went on to say that "[t]he critical textual clues in this case,
however, reinforce the single-offense interpretation implied by the statute's
structure." 169 The Court pointed out that there was no federal tradition of
treating "brandished" as an offense element.170 The Court used Castillo as
an example of its history of singling out "brandished" as a sentencing
factor. 171
162. Id. at 551. If Harris was correct, the seven-year minimum sentence would not apply.
Id.
163. Id. at 552.
164. Id. (quoting Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000)).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000). The principal paragraph reads in relevant part, "[Any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.., uses or
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime .. " Id.
166. Id.; Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 552 (2002). The word "shall" often divides
"offense defining provisions" from provisions that define sentences. Harris, 536 U.S. at 552
(quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233 (1999)).
167. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553.
168. Id. The Court pointed out that was exactly what happened in Jones. Id. In Jones, a
carjacking statute, which had a structure similar to § 924(c)(1)(A), was interpreted as setting out
elements of separate offenses. Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52; see supra notes 124-28 and
accompanying text.
169. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553.
170. Id. The Court relied on tradition and past congressional practice in deciding a similar
statutory question in Jones. Id.; Jones, 526 U.S. at 233-36.
171. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553; see also Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126 (2000)
(stating that "[tiraditional sentencing factors often involve either characteristics of the offender,
such as recidivism, or special features of the manner in which a basic crime was carried out").
The Court in Castillo concluded the quote by using "brandishing a gun" as an example of a
traditional sentencing factor. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 126.
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The Court then pointed out that "brandished" also affects the sentence
for many crimes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 172 The sen-
tencing guidelines seem to be the reason that "brandished" was used in §
924(c)(1)(A).173 "Brandished" does not appear in any other federal statu-
tory offense-defining provision. 174 The Court determined that it was likely
that "brandished" was meant to serve the same function in § 924(c)(1)(A) as
it was meant to serve under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 75
Another reason the Court did not question the presumption that
"brandished" was a sentencing factor was because the finding of
"brandished" did not alter Harris' punishment in any way not usually
associated with sentencing factors.176 Relying on Jones, the Court took into
account the amount the three subsections increased the defendant's
penalties.177 However, the Court found that § 924(c)(1)(A) had an effect on
the defendant's sentence that was more consistent with traditional
understandings about how sentencing factors operated.178 The Court also
found that § 924(c)(1)(A) did not authorize the judge to impose any higher
penalty than he or she already had the power to do under the statute.179 The
Court reasoned that the changes in the mandatory minimum sentences
found in § 924(c)(1)(A) were exactly what someone would expect to see in
traditional sentencing factors meant for the judge to decide.180 The Court
concluded that nothing in the text or the history of the statute rebutted the
presumption that the subsections were sentencing factors to be decided by a
172. Harris, 536 U.S. at 553 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§
2A2.2(b)(2), 2B3.1(b)(2), 2B3.2(b)(3)(A), 2E2.1(b)(l), 2L1.1(b)(4) (2001)).
173. See id. at 553-54 (stating that "the Guidelines appear to have been the only antecedents
for the statute's brandishing provision").
174. Id. at 554. The term "brandished" did not appear in § 924(c)(1)(A) until 1998. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The presumption that "brandished" was a sentencing factor stemmed from the
structure of § 924(c)(1)(A). See id. at 553 (stating that when a statute has the same structure as §
924(c)(1)(A), the Court can presume that the statute's principle paragraph defines a single crime
and its subsections identify sentencing factors).
177. Id. at 554; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233 (1999) (stating that "[i]t is
at best questionable whether the specification of facts sufficient to increase a penalty range by
two-thirds, let alone 15 years to life, was meant to carry none of the process safeguards ... for the
defendant's benefit"). The two subsections of the statute in Jones increased the defendant's
maximum sentence from fifteen years to twenty-five years for subsection (1) and to life for
subsection (2). Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988) (amended 1998)).
178. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554 (2002).
179. Id. Under the statute, the judge may impose a sentence higher than seven years even if
he or she does not find the defendant "brandished" the gun. Id. The sentence that is actually
given to a defendant under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines directly relates to the minimum
sentence prescribed under the statute. See id. at 578 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 554. The subsections of § 924(c)(1)(A) increased the minimum mandatory sen-
tence from five years to seven years to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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judge and not separate offenses that had to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 181
3. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Harris argued that the Court should have adopted the view that §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) was a separate offense by invoking the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance.182 The Court explained that under the doctrine, when a
statute is susceptible of two different constructions, one of which doubtful
constitutional questions arise and the other of which such questions are
avoided, the Court's duty is to adopt the position where the constitutional
questions are avoided.1 83 Harris contended that it was an "open question"
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required a fact increasing a mini-
mum mandatory sentence to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, sub-
mitted to the jury, and alleged in an indictment. 184 He argued that the Court
should avoid the constitutional question by reading § 924(c)(1)(A) as
making "brandished" an element of a separate federal offense. 185
The Court recognized that the canon of constitutional avoidance played
a role in Jones.186 However, the Court also determined that the canon had
no role in Harris.187 The Court reasoned that the canon only applies when
there are serious concerns about a statute's constitutionality.t 88 The Court
found that there were no serious concerns about the constitutionality of §
924(c)(1)(A) because of the Court's holding in McMillan.189 The Court
181. Harris, 536 U.S. at 554.
182. Id. at 555.
183. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
184. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI.
185. Harris, 536 U.S. at 555.
186. Id. A single offense interpretation in Jones implicated constitutional questions about
whether all facts that increase a statutory maximum sentence must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
243 n.6 (1999). The Court found that if the statute was construed the way the Government would
like it, the statute might be unconstitutional. Id. The principle which states any fact that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not established, only suggested in prior cases. Id.; see also
supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court later resolved this statutory
question in Apprendi. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any
fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt); see also supra notes 138-48 and accompanying
text.
187. Harris, 536 U.S. at 555.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (rejecting the peti-
tioner's argument that "visible possession" was actually a set of upgraded felonies that must be
proven by at least clear and convincing evidence).
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went on to say, "[Pletitioner's proposed rule-that the Constitution requires
any fact increasing the statutory minimum sentence to be accorded the safe-
guards assigned to elements-was rejected 16 years ago in McMillan."190
Harris argued that to avoid deciding whether McMillan should be
overruled, the Court should find that the statute set forth separate federal
offenses.191 The Court found Harris' argument to be unsound because
McMillan was already decided when § 924(c)(1)(A) was enacted. 92 The
Court then pointed out that the canon of constitutional avoidance rests on
the Court's respect for Congress. 93 Congress relied on McMillan when it
passed § 924(c)(1)(A), and Congress would not have had any reason to
believe that it was "approaching the constitutional line." 94 The Court
found that it would not further the goal of the canon of constitutional
avoidance by adopting a reading different from the reading adopted in
McMillan because Congress had adopted § 924(c)(1)(A) in reliance on the
Court's decision. 95 The Court determined that if it interpreted §
924(c)(1)(A) as setting forth separate federal offenses to avoid deciding
whether McMillan should be overruled or not, "the canon would embrace a
dynamic view of statutory interpretation, under which the text might mean
one thing when enacted yet another if the prevailing view of the
Constitution later changed."19
6
4. Summary of Majority Opinion
The Court concluded that as a matter of statutory construction, §
924(c)(1)(A) defined a single offense.197 The statute set forth "brandished"
as a sentencing factor to be found by a judge, not a separate offense element
that needed to be found by the jury. 198
In part four of the Supreme Court's opinion, the Court reaffirmed
McMillan and found § 924(c)(1)(A) to be constitutional. 99 Basing a two-
190. Harris, 536 U.S. at 555.
191. Id. at 555-56.
192. Id. at 556. McMillan was decided in 1986 and § 924(c)(1)(A) was enacted in 1988.
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
193. Harris, 536 U.S. at 556 (citing Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)). The Court
assumes that Congress legislates within the boundaries set by the Constitution. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The goal of the canon of constitutional avoidance is to reduce friction between the
judicial and legislative branch. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. "Discharging" was also found to be a sentencing factor that was to be determined
by a judge. Id. "Discharging" was set forth in subsection (iii) of § 924(c)(1)(A). 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(l)(A)(iii) (2000).
199. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002).
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year increase of a mandatory minimum sentence on a judicial finding of
"brandished" did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 200 The Court
reasoned that Congress "simply took one factor that has always been
considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment... and dictated the
precise weight to be given that factor."201
The Court acknowledged that many people do not agree with man-
datory minimum sentences. 202 However, it determined that the criticisms
would still exist whether the judge or jury found the facts that increased a
minimum sentence.20 3 The Constitution permits the judge to find such a
factor, and the Court left the questions about the wisdom of mandatory
minimums to "Congress, the States, and the democratic processes." 204
B. THE PLURALITY OPINION
In part three of the opinion, a plurality of the Court found that
McMillan was still sound authority after Apprendi.2 5 The plurality
reasoned that the doctrine of stare decisis made it very difficult for the
Court to overrule prior authority. 20 6 The plurality then found that McMillan
and Apprendi were consistent because there was a fundamental distinction
between their facts. 207 The plurality also pointed out that history led to the
conclusion that § 924(c)(1)(A) was constitutional. 208 The plurality con-
cluded that it was critical not to abandon the views set forth in McMillan
because so many statutes had been written relying on it.209
The plurality first considered Harris' argument that § 924(c)(1)(A) was
unconstitutional because McMillan was no longer sound authority.210 The
plurality pointed out that stare decisis is "of fundamental importance to the
rule of law." 211 The Court needs a "special justification" to overrule prior
precedent, even in constitutional cases. 212
200. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI.




204. Id. at 568-69.
205. Id. at 566-68.
206. Id. at 556-57.
207. Id. at 557.
208. Id. at 558-65.
209. Id. at 567.
210. Id. at 556. A majority of the Court refused to use the canon of constitutional avoidance
to prevent answering whether McMillan was still sound authority. Id.
211. Id. at 556-57 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
494 (1987)). The definition of stare decisis is "[t]o abide by decided cases. Judicial doctrine that
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Harris offered the Court's decision in Apprendi as the special justifica-
tion for overruling McMillan.213 The plurality did not find Harris' argu-
ment convincing. 214 It determined that McMillan and Apprendi were
consistent because there was a fundamental distinction between the factual
findings at issue in each case.215 The Court found in Apprendi that any fact,
other than prior convictions, that extended a defendant's sentence beyond
the statutory maximum was an element of an aggravated crime that must be
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,216 while McMillan dealt with
the imposition of statutory minimum sentences by finding certain facts.217
The plurality recognized that McMillan was not inconsistent with
Apprendi because the statute in McMillan operated "solely to limit the
sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already
available to it."218 McMillan simply took one factor that had always been
considered to bear on punishment and dictated the precise weight of that
factor.219
At issue in Apprendi, by contrast, was a sentencing factor that ex-
panded the penalty for the defendant above what the law had provided. 220
The plurality agreed with the Court in Apprendi that those facts that in-
crease the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.221 Those facts
were what the "[f]ramers had in mind when they spoke of 'crimes' and
'criminal prosecutions' in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 222
The plurality concluded that Apprendi did not undermine the con-
clusions set forth in McMillan.223 The Court in Apprendi specifically stated
holds that legal precedent will not be set aside unless there is good cause to do so." GILBERT LAW
SUMMARIES LAW DICTIONARY 314 (1997).
212. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
213. Id. Harris asserted that McMillan and Apprendi could not be reconciled. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In Apprendi, there was a hate
crime statute that authorized an increase of a defendant's maximum sentence when a judge found
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate the
victim based on particular characteristics. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
217. Harris, 536 U.S. at 557-58; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986). The
statute at issue in McMillan used "visible possession of a firearm" to invoke a minimum manda-
tory sentence of five years under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act. Id. at 80-
81.
218. Harris, 536 U.S. at 559 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88).
219. Id. (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90).
220. Id. at 562.
221. Id. at 562-63 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
222. Id. at 563 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
223. Id.
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that its ruling did not affect McMillan.224 The plurality noted that "[a]s its
holding and the history on which it was based would suggest, the Apprendi
Court's understanding of the Constitution [was] consistent with the holding
in McMillan."225 The plurality quoted Apprendi in saying, "Nothing in this
history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise dis-
cretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense
and offender-in imposing a judgment within the statutory range."226 In
both Harris and McMillan, the fact-finding by the judge did not expose the
defendant to punishment outside the statutory limits. 22 7
Harris then argued that the concerns underlying Apprendi should apply
with more force to facts increasing a defendant's minimum sentence
because those factual findings have a greater impact on the defendant.
228
Harris believed that this argument was evident because when a fact
increasing the statutory maximum is found, the judge may still impose a
sentence far below that maximum, but when a fact increasing the minimum
is found, the judge has no choice but to impose that minimum.
229
The plurality answered by stating that "a factual finding's practical
effect cannot by itself control the constitutional analysis." 230 The Fifth and
Sixth Amendments ensure that a defendant will never receive more
punishment than "he bargained for" when he committed the crime, but they
do not guarantee that the defendant will receive "anything less" than that.
231
A fact is not considered an element just because it affects a defendant's
sentence. 232 The plurality determined that it was critical not to abandon this
understanding of McMillan because so many statutes have been written
relying on its conclusions. 233
224. Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13) (stating, "We do not overrule McMillan. We
limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the
statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict... .
225. Id. at 564.
226. Id. at 565 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481).
227. Id.; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986).
228. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565-66 (2002).
229. Id. at 566 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1998)).
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 567-68 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a)(4) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(b)
(Michie 2000); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(D) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4618
(1995); MD. CODE. ANN., Art. 27, § 286 (Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.11 (West Supp.
2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-6(c)-(d) (West 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9717(a) (1998)
(conditioning mandatory minimum sentences upon judicial findings)).
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C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in its entirety.
2 34
She pointed out that it was easy to reject Harris' arguments because she
believed that Jones and Apprendi were decided wrongly. 235 Even assuming
that Jones and Apprendi were decided correctly, Justice O'Connor found
Harris' argument "unavailing." 23
6
D. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer could not distinguish Harris from Apprendi "in terms of
logic." 237 He did not agree with the plurality's opinion insofar as it found a
distinction between Harris and Apprendi.238 Justice Breyer pointed out that
the Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors, whether
applying a sentence beyond the statutory maximum or applying a
mandatory minimum sentence. 239 He believed that applying Apprendi to
mandatory minimum sentences would have adverse practical and legal con-
sequences. 240 This belief is why Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion
to the extent it held Apprendi did not apply to mandatory minimums. 241
Justice Breyer voiced his disapproval of mandatory minimum sen-
tences as a matter of policy. 242 He stated that mandatory minimum
sentences are inconsistent with the use of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 243 This is because unlike sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum
sentences do not give the judge any power to depart downward. 244 Justice
Breyer believed that the sentencing guidelines transfer power to prosecutors
"who can determine sentences through the charges they decide to bring, and
234. Id. at 569 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. Id.; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 254-72 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002).
237. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Justice Breyer stated that application of Apprendi would take power away from a
judge and give it to prosecutors instead of juries. Id. at 571. Justice Breyer also stated that
application of Apprendi in this context "would diminish further Congress' otherwise broad
constitutional authority to define crimes through the specification of elements, to shape criminal
sentences through specification of sentencing factors, and to limit judicial discretion in applying
those factors in particular cases." Id. at 572.
241. Id. at 569-70.
242. Id. at 570-71.
243. Id. at 570.
244. Id. (citing Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 132-33 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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who thereby have reintroduced much of the sentencing disparity that
Congress created Guidelines to eliminate."245
Justice Breyer concluded by saying that applying Apprendi in Harris
would not lead Congress to abolish mandatory minimum sentences. 246
Applying Apprendi to Harris would merely take the power to make a
factual determination away from the judge and give it to the prosecutor. 247
E. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
Justice Thomas, who was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, dissented. 248 Justice Thomas determined that McMillan
conflicted with the Court's decision in Apprendi, and therefore McMillan
should be overruled. 249  He stated that as a constitutional matter,
"brandished" must be construed as an element of an aggravated offense.250
He concluded that only a minority of the Court found a distinction between
Apprendi and McMillan.251 Therefore, Justice Thomas stated he would
have reaffirmed Apprendi, overruled McMillan, and reversed the court of
appeals. 252
Justice Thomas started by pointing out that "[a]s with Apprendi, this
case turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes a
'crime."' 253 This question cannot be answered by looking at statutory
construction alone.254 The original understanding of what facts constituted
elements of a crime was "expansive." 255 Justice Thomas went on to say
that even if legislatures created a crime and then provided that the
punishment would be increased upon the finding of certain "aggravating"
facts, the "core crime and the aggravating facts together constitute an
aggravated crime." 256 The Court need only look at what "kind, degree, or
range of punishment" the prosecution may give for a particular set of
245. Id. at 571.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 572-73.
250. Id. at 576.
251. Id. at 581-82. Only a plurality of the Court embraced section three of the opinion. Id.
at 548.
252. Id. at 573.
253. Id. at 575.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)). Justice Thomas also stated that "if the legislature, rather than creating grades of
crimes, has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact... that fact is also
an element." Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501).
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facts.257 Each fact that is given an entitlement of a different punishment is
an element of the crime. 258
Justice Thomas recognized that when a defendant "brandished" a
firearm it altered the prescribed range of punishment that the defendant was
exposed to under § 924(c)(1)(A). 259 Because of this alteration, "it is
ultimately beside the point whether as a matter of statutory interpretation
brandishing is a sentencing factor, because as a constitutional matter
brandishing must be deemed an element of an aggravated offense."2 60
Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Stevens' dissent in McMillan that
the protections afforded by the Constitution come into play when a
particular fact gives rise to "both a special stigma and to a special
punishment."261 The Court made clear in Apprendi, Justice Thomas pointed
out, "that if a statute 'annexes a higher degree of punishment' based on
certain circumstances, exposing a defendant to that higher degree of
punishment requires that those circumstances be charged in the indictment
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."262 That limitation would protect a
defendant's constitutional right to know the circumstances that will
determine his or her punishment. 263
Justice Thomas argued that the majority's analysis was flawed. 264 An
increased mandatory minimum sentence increases the loss of liberty and
257. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501).
258. Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501).
259. Id. at 575-76. Without a finding of "brandished," the sentencing range that the
defendant was exposed to was five years to life in prison. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
With a finding that the defendant "brandished" a firearm, the defendant was exposed to between
seven years and life in prison. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 576 (2002); §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii). If the defendant was found to have "discharged" a firearm, the range that the
defendant was exposed to is between ten years and life in prison. Harris, 536 U.S. at 576; §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
260. Harris, 536 U.S. at 576 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10) (stating that the "[flacts
that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by
definition 'elements' of a separate legal offense")).
261. Id. (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
262. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480).
263. Id. at 577. The Apprendi Court stated:
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed
under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma
attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not-at
the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances -be deprived of protections that have,
until that point, unquestionably attached.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
264. Harris, 536 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The analysis that Justice Thomas
referred to was the majority's view that facts do not need to be alleged in the indictment,
submitted to the jury, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt if they do not increase the punishment
for the crime beyond the statutory maximum. Id.
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stigma society attaches to the crime. 265 Because of this increase in stigma
and loss of liberty, Justice Thomas noted: "[Flacts that trigger an increased
mandatory minimum sentence warrant constitutional safeguards." 266
Justice Thomas then argued that actual sentencing practices supported
his conclusion.267  He noted that even though theoretically anyone
convicted of violating § 924(c)(1)(A) is eligible to receive a sentence as
severe as life in prison, almost all people sentenced for violations have been
sentenced to five, seven, or ten years in prison.268 If the Court's view of
sentencing factors prevails, the Apprendi holding could easily be avoided
by statutory drafting.
269
Justice Thomas then stated that even though Apprendi dealt with a fact
that increased the punishment for a crime beyond a statutory maximum, the
principles that the Court in Apprendi relied upon should be applied equally
to facts that expose a defendant to a higher mandatory minimum
sentence.270 Justice Thomas recognized that "[w]hether one raises the floor
or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed
to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed." 271 Justice Thomas
concluded that there were "no logical grounds" for treating facts that raised
mandatory minimum sentences different than facts that raised statutory
maximums. 272 "In either case the defendant cannot predict the judgment
from the face of the felony, . . . and the absolute statutory limits of his
punishment change, constituting an increased penalty." 273 Defendants
should be afforded the protections of notice, jury trial, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to facts that expose them to higher
penalties. 274
Justice Thomas continued by arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis
should also not dictate the outcome in Harris.275 He believed that the stare
decisis effect of McMillan was significantly weakened for many different
265. Id. at 577-78.
266. Id. at 578.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 DATAFILE, USSCFY01,
TABLE 1 (2001)). "Indeed it is a certainty that in virtually every instance the sentence imposed for
a § 924(c)(1)(A) violation is tied directly to the applicable mandatory minimum." Id. at 578 n.4.
269. Id. at 579.
270. Id.
271. Id. "When a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than what is otherwise
legally prescribed, that fact is 'by definition an 'element' of a separate legal offense."' Id.
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 579-80.
274. Id. at 580.
275. Id. at 581.
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reasons. 276 First, when the Court has decided a constitutional question
wrongly, the force of stare decisis is at its weakest. 277 It is essential that the
Court uphold absolute devotion to the protections of the individual given by
the notice, trial by jury, and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements.
278
Second, before the majority's decision in Harris, "no one seriously believed
that the Court's earlier decision in McMillan could coexist with the logical
implications of the Court's later decisions in Apprendi and Jones."279 The
principle of stare decisis may yield when a prior decision's "underpinnings
have been eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court." 280 Justice
Thomas added that only a minority of the Court found a distinction between
McMillan and Apprendi, which further supported his conclusions. 2
81
Because he could not distinguish the issue in Harris from the doctrine
underlying the Court's decision in Apprendi, Justice Thomas respectfully
dissented.282
IV. IMPACT
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision in Harris clarified some questions about
statutory construction left by Apprendi, but it left others still unanswered. 283
Despite the plurality's opinion reaffirming McMillan, a majority of the
Court did not see a distinction between McMillan and Apprendi, which
might still provide questions about the reasoning behind the Court's
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
235 (1997)).
278. Id. at 581-82.
279. Id. at 582. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Thomas in her Apprendi dissent.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 533 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "Accordingly, it is
incumbent on the Court not only to admit that it is overruling McMillan, but also to explain why
such a course of action is appropriate under normal principles of stare decisis." Id.
280. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 583 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
281. Id. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment of the Court but did not find a distinction
between Apprendi and Harris. Id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 583.
283. See Swan, supra note 149 at 730 (stating that "[tihe new issue troubling courts
throughout the nation is the breadth and scope of the Apprendi rule that any fact, other than prior
conviction, used to extend a defendant's sentence over the statutory maximum, must be charged in
an indictment, and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").
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decision in Harris.284 The Court's holding in Apprendi left three main
questions to be answered by the Court in Harris.285
1. Federal and State Sentencing Schemes
One major question that the decision in Harris resolved was the scope
of the Apprendi rule. 286 There was much debate on whether the Court's
decision in Apprendi should be extended to facts that increased a defen-
dant's mandatory minimum sentence but did not extend the defendant's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 287 Although the circuits were
unanimous in their view that Apprendi did not apply to sentencing factors
that increased a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence, 288 the Court's
284. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out that Justice Breyer
could not find a distinction between McMillan and Apprendi).
285. See Swan, supra note 149, at 763 (stating that the holding in Apprendi threatens to upset
sentencing schemes, capital punishment cases, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). Another
question left open by Apprendi was the effect of the holding on felony drug cases. Id. at 771.
286. Harris, 536 U.S. at 562-65.
287. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 544 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the principle set forth by the majority not only would have to apply to increases in
statutory maximum sentences, it would have to apply to "all determinate sentencing schemes in
which the length of a defendant's sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual
determinations"); Swan, supra note 149, at 768 (stating that "[a]lthough the majority declined to
hold whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines remained constitutional, the likely result of the
Court's rule if applied broadly is that the Guidelines are invalid").
288. See, e.g., United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the peti-
tioner's argument that Apprendi should be extended to all facts that impact the defendant's sen-
tence, even if still within the statutory maximum); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183 (2d
Cir. 2001) (stating "[wie see nothing in the Court's holding in Apprendi or its explication of the
holding that alters a sentencing judge's traditional authority to determine those facts relevant to
selection of an appropriate sentence within the statutory maximum"); United States v. Williams,
235 F.3d 858, 862-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi did not apply to the defendant's
increase in sentence under the sentencing guidelines when the increase was within the statutory
maximum); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi
did not apply to sentence increases within the statutory maximum); United States v. Doggett, 230
F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the petitioner's sentence did not violate the Sixth
Amendment or his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because the district judge's
finding of the amount of drugs simply assisted the judge in rendering the proper sentence within
the statutory range already authorized by the jury's verdict); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d
528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that Apprendi was not triggered because the defendant's murder
sentence was within the twenty-year maximum); Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.
2000) (stating, "Apprendi does not affect application of the relevant-conduct rules under the
Sentencing Guidelines to sentences that fall within a statutory cap"); United States v. Aguayo-
Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that a judge-found fact may alter a
defendant's sentence within the range authorized by statute); United States v. Hernandez-
Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that enhancing the defendant's
sentence under the guidelines did not violate Apprendi because it was within the ten year
maximum sentence); United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
that Apprendi did not apply to sentencing enhancements that were within the statutory maximum).
But see United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 576 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled by United States
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (explained in United States v. Randle, 304 F.3d 373, 377 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2002)). The court in Meshack stated, "Apprendi does not clearly resolve whether an
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decision in Harris solidified the circuits' prior holdings.289 Since many
statutes, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, were drafted relying
on the Court's decision in McMillan, the Court's decision in Harris should
not cause widespread changes in statutory construction. 290 Harris made it
clear that statutory schemes that allow a judge to decide facts that alter a
defendant's sentence within the statutory range prescribed by law do not
violate due process.2
9'
2. Capital Punishment Cases
Apprendi left open questions about the constitutionality of the nation's
capital punishment laws. 292 This concern was made moot by the Supreme
Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona.293 The Court in Ring held that capital
defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the
legislature conditioned an increase in the maximum punishment. 294 This
essentially eliminated the judge's role in handing down death sentences.
295
3. Felony Drug Cases
Very similar to the concern about the constitutionality of state
sentencing schemes was the concern about the constitutionality of the
federal drug laws and their imposition under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 296 Just as it did sentencing schemes, the Court's opinion in
Harris reaffirmed the view of the circuits. 297 Although the Court's opinion
in Harris will not cause widespread changes in statutory construction, it
enhancement which increases a sentence within the statutory range but which does not increase
the sentence beyond that range must be proved to the jury." Meshack, 225 F.3d at 576.
289. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 556 (holding that the statute set forth a single offense in which
"brandished" was a sentencing factor that could be found by the judge).
290. See id. at 567 (stating that "[l]egislatures and their constituents have relied upon
McMillan to exercise control over sentencing through dozens of statutes like the one the Court
approved in that case"). The Court in McMillan ruled that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act violated due process by treating "visible possession of a firearm" as a sentencing
factor instead of an element of the crime. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986).
291. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568 (reaffirming McMillan and finding 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A) to be constitutional).
292. Swan, supra note 149, at 764-65. The Court's decision in Apprendi called into question
the constitutionality of a sentencing judge increasing a sentence of life imprisonment to death. Id.
293. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
294. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
295. See id. at 609 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial precludes a
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, from finding aggravating circumstances necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty).
296. See Swan, supra note 149, at 771 (stating that "[miany commentators have predicted
Apprendi would result in a massive overhaul of sentencing schemes, especially in the realm of
drug convictions").
297. See supra note 289; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
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will give legislatures and lower courts much needed guidance in drafting
and defining "what constitutes a crime." 298
B. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA
The Court's opinion in Harris will also affect how judges in North
Dakota sentence defendants. 299 The legislature in North Dakota can now
draft statutes with confidence, knowing that judges may decide facts that
increase a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence within the statutory
range. 300
There is one North Dakota decision that dealt particularly with
Apprendi and the sentencing factor versus element distinction. 301 The peti-
tioner in Clark v. State302 argued that Apprendi applied to his fifteen-year
incarceration because it was above the statutory maximum of ten years. 303
While affirming Clark's conviction on other grounds, 304 the North Dakota
Supreme Court pointed out that section 12.1-32-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code might not withstand constitutional challenge under the rule
announced in Apprendi.305 The court urged the legislature to address the
constitutional concerns and make necessary amendments to bring the statute
within Apprendi's constitutional requirements. 306 Because the Supreme
Court of North Dakota recognized the Apprendi rule in Clark, it will not
have to make many adjustments for the decision in Harris.307
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Harris did not overrule
McMillan or Apprendi, the North Dakota statutory scheme can remained
unchanged. 308 The North Dakota Uniform Controlled Substances Act
increases sentencing ranges for each class of drug depending on the number
298. See generally Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
299. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-01-44 (2001) (setting out North Dakota's
sentencing scheme for controlled substances).
300. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568 (stating that the Court saw no reason to overturn statutes
that allowed a judge to increase a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence within the prescribed
statutory range).
301. See generally Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, 621 N.W.2d 576. In Clark, the defendant was
found guilty of manslaughter, a class B felony under North Dakota law. Id. 5 2, 621 N.W.2d at
577. The trial court sentenced Clark to a ten-year maximum sentence and then sentenced Clark to
an additional five years as a "dangerous special offender." Id.
302. 2001 ND 9, 621 N.W.2d 576.
303. Clark, 2, 621 N.W.2d at 577.
304. See id. 5 16, 621 N.W.2d at 581-82 (confirming the petitioner's conviction because even
if Apprendi applied, the mistake by the trial court was harmless error).
305. Id. 11,621 N.W.2d at 580 n.1.
306. Id.
307. See id. 11, 621 N.W.2d at 580 (adopting the rule set forth in Apprendi).
308. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-01-44 (2001) (setting out North Dakota's
sentencing scheme for controlled substances).
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of prior offenses by the defendant.309 As long as a fact does not increase
the possible penalty for a defendant above that statutory maximum, the
judge may decide if the fact exists by a preponderance of the evidence. 310
As the court pointed out in Clark, North Dakota's sentencing scheme
possibly had a constitutional problem under section 12.1-32-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code.311 The legislature has since remedied the problem
pointed out by the court. 312 Because the legislature has taken account of the
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, the Court's decision in Harris
should only clarify what the legislature is allowed to do in North Dakota.313
V. CONCLUSION
In Harris v. United States, the United States Supreme Court further
defined what facts constitute elements of a crime. 314 The Court held that
"brandished" a firearm is a sentencing factor rather than an element of a
crime, and allowing a judge to find that factor did not violate Harris' con-
stitutional rights. 315 By basing a two-year increase in Harris' minimum sen-
tence on a judicial finding of brandishing, Congress simply took one factor
that had always been considered by courts to bear on punishment and deter-
mined the precise weight to be given that factor. 316 The Court reaffirmed
McMillan and Apprendi by holding that any fact other than a prior con-
viction that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum is an element of a crime, which must be submitted to a jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.317 Judges and legislatures now
309. See, e.g., id. § 19-03.1-23(l)(a). If a defendant is found guilty of possessing a con-
trolled substance classified as a narcotic drug or methamphetamine, the defendant is guilty of a
class A felony and must be sentenced to at least five years for a second offense or to at least
twenty years for a third or subsequent offense. Id. The same scheme is used for subsection (b) of
the statute. Id. § 19-03.1-23(1)(b). Subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1) set forth the statutory minimum
that a defendant must be sentenced to if he or she is found guilty under the statute; while sub-
sections (a)(2) and (b)(2) set forth the statutory maximum that a defendant may be sentenced to
under the statute. Id. § 19-03.1-23.
310. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002).
311. Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9,5J 11,621 N.W.2d 576, 580 n.l.
312. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(4)(a) (stating that a hearing must be held in front of
a jury if, before a sentence is imposed, it is alleged that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender under subdivisions (a), (b), (d), or (e) of subsection (1)). The jury, or the court if the jury
is waived, must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a dangerous special offender.
Id.
313. See generally id.
314. Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
315. Id. at 556.
316. Id. at 568 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986)).
317. Id.
2003]
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know with more certainty what facts the judge can decide and what facts
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